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A Comparative Empirical Study of Negotiation in 
Criminal Proceedings Between Brazil and the United 
States of America 
Ricardo Gueiros Bernardes Dias1 
ABSTRACT: The present research aims to understand the law in re-
gards to the types of negotiations performed under the law of crimi-
nal procedure and to understand how the discursive practice of law-
yers can organize social practices from a comparative empirical 
perspective of Brazil and the United States of America. Thus, the re-
search comparatively investigates the institutional processes for the 
establishment of truth before the bodies of the judicial branch in Bra-
zil (metropolitan region of Vitória, ES-Brazil) and in the U.S. (Cali-
fornia, San Francisco) and focuses on their differences in their crimi-
nal negotiation in the special criminal courts and the institution of 
plea bargaining, which is widely used in the U.S. judicial system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars appear to be increasingly convinced that they must in-
terpret any law, court order, or legal doctrine by considering the posi-
tion of the executive and legislative branches, the context of the judi-
cial culture, and the actions of the juridical agents that permeate the 
field of law. The interests of society diversely affect different fields 
of law. Therefore, the concern addressed in the present study is to 
understand the law from a comparative empirical perspective, primar-
ily in Brazil and the United States, and to understand how the discur-
sive practice of lawyers might organize social practices, particularly 
in regards to the forms of negotiation used in criminal justice in the 
context of individual rights at the same time. 
The distinction between theory and practice is the cornerstone of 
legal interpretation. The ideas behind theory and practice lead toward 
two different roads at different speeds. It has been said that it is 
commonplace to talk about human rights; however, little has been 
achieved in terms of the effectiveness of turning aspirations into fac-
tual rights.2 The prevalent methodology is qualitative, consisting of 
fieldwork, participant observations, and comparisons between the 
systems in question. This observation was made in person in the 
courts of first instance, both in Brazil and the United States, and 
achieved effective participation of those who will receive the adjudi-
cation simply by being there. 
Participant observations, open interviews, and other methods of 
fieldwork were performed in direct and unabated contact for a con-
siderable period of time with the involved actors. The dialogue justi-
fies why it is necessary to incorporate the reasons of the actors within 
the environment in which the researcher starts to act. Fieldwork in-
volves an inter-subjective relation in which there is no neutrality, but 
rather an interest to incorporate the environment. It is essential to 
know what the interlocutors think. Consequently, it is necessary to 
contextualize the collected data within an academic culture. In fact, 
good science requires fieldwork, as information is extracted from the 
actors that participate in the process.3 
 
 2. NORBERTO BOBBIO, A ERA DOS DIREITOS, 67 (1992). 
 3. ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, A ANTROPOLOGIA DA ACADEMIA: QUANDO OS INDIOS SOMOS 
NOS 16 (1997). 
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There is no intention to assert that traditional rituals never work; 
the ancient custom of praying in Latin, which is performed by the 
priest, reaches its goal of maintaining the ignorance of the faithful. 
However, the claim made here is part of the communication inclu-
sion. 
FIELDWORK ON PLEA BARGAINING IN THE U.S. 
If it were possible to choose a basic premise to contextualize the 
criminal justice system in the United States, it would be the follow-
ing: “controlling the coexistence with impurity and crime, and not 
purifying it or banishing it.”4  
According to the same author, this would be the same as affirm-
ing that crime in the United States has a relationship with sin. In other 
words, crime is a voluntary choice of the perpetrator.5 There is a clear 
division between those who obey these consensual rules and those 
who deliberately and explicitly defy these rules.6 In addition, this has 
an immediate and direct relationship with the form of production of 
truth in the adversarial model, which is based on a constant search for 
consensus.7 Unlike Brazil, the United States judicial system’s search 
for consensus is essential for the recognition of self-knowledge.8 
In Brazil, there is no intention to reach a consensus—i.e., to es-
tablish such facts—nor to agree upon the evidence to be brought to 
trial.9 The process calls for consensus, but often fails due to the na-
ture of the facts, which often contradict each other. After hearing the 
opposing arguments, the judge makes a ruling on a particular convic-
tion, a decision which is often contaminated by several variables, ac-
cording to empirical research.10 
 
 4. ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, ENSAIOS DE ANTROPOLOGIA E DE DIREITO: ACESSO À JUSTIÇA 
E PROCESSOS INSTITUCIONAIS DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE CONFLITOS E PRODUÇÃO DA 
VERDADE JURÍDICA EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA (2008). 
 5. Id.   
 6. Id.   
 7. Id.   
 8. Id.   
 9. Id.   
 10. ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, SENSIBILIDADES JURÍDICAS, DEFINIÇÕES DE JUSTIÇA E 
PROCESSO PENAL (2012). 
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a. The First Contact 
“This is the best thing that I can do for him.” This was one of the 
first phrases I heard at an informal hearing of plea bargaining that 
took place in the chamber11 of the Hall of Justice in San Francisco. 
The following individuals were present: the District Attorney, the de-
fendant’s lawyer, and the judge. The words of the District Attorney 
were addressed—in front of the judge—to the lawyer of the defend-
ant. These words were related to a proposal that had just been pre-
sented to allow the defendant to avoid a trial. In other words, the ac-
ceptance of the offer by the defendant would represent the end of the 
dispute and, as a consequence, the resolution of the conflict. The sen-
tence would then be imposed not from a procedure that targets the 
search for the “truth” of the facts but from an agreement with the 
purpose, among others, to avoid trial. The lawyer—waiting for the 
judge’s reaction (who remained inert) —decided to accept the pro-
posal. 
The scene above describes not only what is observed in everyday 
life in American criminal courts, but also is much more than that: it 
is, in fact, the core of the “ritual” of almost all defendants accused of 
having committed a crime. The cinematic image of the American 
judgments performed in the presence of the jury only occurs in a 
small number of cases, as will be observed. On average, almost 96% 
of the criminal cases before U.S. courts are resolved through a nego-
tiation called plea bargaining.12 
As one who comes from a civil culture, it was initially a natural 
curiosity to discover the juridical rules that regulate plea bargaining. 
After all, if almost all of the cases are assessed according to this rule, 
it would be expected that a detailed formal procedure of the entire le-
gal ritual in use is available. 
The first attempt was to use the index of the California Penal 
Code,13 which resulted in the identification of the first obstacle. The 
initial impressions from the common law dated back to an idea of a 
 
 11. Chamber is the term assigned to the office used by the judges within the court. 
 12. John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defend-
ants Who Plead Guilty, 113 (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers 2014), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1116&context=clsops_p
apers. 
 13. CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West). 
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small number of written rules and a wide use of legal precedents.14 In 
other words, there was a notion that customary law had its roots in 
solving its disputes in the tradition of previous trials. This is what is 
generally taught in the law courses in Brazil. Note that there was a 
complete lack of formal legal rules, but their existence was imagined 
to be limited to the formulation of general rules and the characteriza-
tion of a reasonable number of crimes. The very principled, generic 
conception of the U.S. Constitution provided this first notion. 
There was, however, a Code15 of over 34,370 sections in Califor-
nia, notwithstanding the existing extravagant criminal legislation.16 In 
contrast, the combined number of articles of the Brazilian penal code 
and criminal procedure code is 1,172 (361 articles of the penal code 
and 811 of the criminal procedure code).17 In addition, the subdivi-
sions of the sections of the California Penal Code can be extremely 
long, as they are sometimes written in an informal language with a 
highly explicative intention. For example, California Penal Code § 
830 with its subdivisions fills twenty-three pages of the Code.18 We 
must remember in advance that there is no separate or distinct crimi-
nal procedure code in the state of California. All procedural rules are 
embedded in the actual California Penal Code. In fact, contrary to 
what we have in Brazil, there is no academic concern associated with 
conducting a detailed study on the nature of the procedure as a mere 
instrument for conflict resolution or as a true autonomous figure. In-
 
 14. The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, U.C. (March 8, 2016), 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html.  
 15. CAL. CODE. REGS. (2016). In fact, this is more a compilation of rules than a code (as it 
is known in Brazil). In the U.S., the Member State may legislate on criminal matters. 
In fact, there is no penal code with national coverage. There is – in truth – the Model 
Penal Code, which is a document written mostly by scholars as an attempt to homoge-
nize the state penal law. Therefore, it is not a law in the strict sense due to its non-
obligatory aspect. Nevertheless, the adherence to this text is widely applied in approx-
imately two-thirds of the American states. However, these rules are commonly used at 
the federal level and do not make any reference to plea bargaining. It is important to 
highlight the existence of the “Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”, which are rules 
issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and sent to Congress for “approval.” Rule 11 ex-
pressly provides the figure of plea agreement, which is essentially the same institution 
that is known as plea bargaining. However, these norms are also limited to the sphere 
of federal crimes.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 16. CAL. PENAL CODE INDEX (West). 
 17. BRAZIL.C.C.; BRAZIL C.P.P. 
 18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830-830.15 (West 2016). 
A Comparative Empirical Study of Negotiation Vol. IV, No. II 
 65 
cidentally, when pursuing the criminal procedure discipline in the lit-
erature used in the universities, the primary focus is on the constitu-
tional principles of criminal procedure. 
First I searched for a systematic index in which the formulation 
of the discipline of plea bargaining rules could be found. There was 
no exclusive section for plea bargaining in the index. I then per-
formed a quick reading of the 639 sections associated with the rules 
of criminal procedure of the state of California. This search was also 
in vain. Despite some scarce retrievals of the term “plead guilty” 
throughout the code, there were no plea bargaining regulations. 
Moreover, there was not even the impression that it would be possi-
ble to use this procedure. A simple reading of the code led to the be-
lief that the trial, either by a jury or by the judge himself (in the form 
of a bench trial), was the most common destination of the cases to be 
examined by the judiciary branch. 
Before investigating the legal literature that would be the pillar 
of the legal institution of plea bargaining, I decided to search for an-
swers from actual practitioners of law. In other words, I decided to 
research the common notion among those who used it more. When I 
posed this inquiry to a former public defender, he replied, “I believe 
there is no special section of the disciplinary code for this theme. It is 
more of a procedure established by decisions.”19 In this answer, we 
can see an uncertainty related to the non-existence of formal laws on 
the subject. This uncertainty in itself already indicated something: 
even if there was a regulation, it would not be the main parameter of 
the operators of law. If this is not the case, the public defender would 
at least declare its existence, even if he did not know its contents). 
When Judge “J” from the Hall of Justice was asked this intri-
guing question, he replied evasively without facing the problem di-
rectly: 
This is an interesting question. I believe there are some 
sections of the code that do not “advise” plea bargaining in 
some situations. Well, I do not know ... I have been a judge 
for only 3 years. Before this period, I was a public defender 
for nearly 30 years. Throughout this period of 30 years, I 
participated in several plea bargaining hearings in San Fran-
 
 19. Interview with former Pub. Def., in Cal. 
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cisco and in many other Counties. And each site uses a dif-
ferent type of procedure. Only in counties with higher crime 
rates you will find plea bargaining as you find it in San 
Francisco. In counties where there is no high index of 
crimes of greater offensive potential, you do not even notice 
the participation of the judge in the negotiations. The Dis-
trict Attorney will make an offer and it is done! And it has 
an explanation in my view. A greater number of crimes ob-
viously results in a greater number of cases.20 
It is perhaps for this reason that this theme captured so much of 
my attention. Upon arriving in the U.S., there was no precise delimi-
tation of the subject to be investigated. There was a desire to investi-
gate the models of the production of truth in the American process. In 
addition, at first sight there was no production of truth to be actually 
“found” but rather negotiated in a system of dispute settlement that 
has a huge legal standardization. This however is apparently used on-
ly for cases that are brought to trial. In other words, the solution to 
almost all of the disputes brought to court is based on a procedure 
performed backstage of the courtroom and that has as its premise a 
procedure that is not formally legislated.  
The California Penal Code was primarily mentioned by the ac-
tors of the process as will be shown later to verify a possible legal 
classification of the criminal conducts.21 Thus, the widespread use of 
this ritual, which dictates almost all prosecutions, and the ritual that 
follows the recent tradition were the main reasons for the thematic 
delimitation. In fact, plea bargaining has become the “talk of the 
town.” It is rare to find someone even outside of the legal field that is 
unfamiliar and does not have his own opinion on the subject. This is 
not a procedural technicality. In Brazil, these discussions are limited 
to the defendants, and in most cases to their representatives. 
 b. The Judge’s Participation In The Bargaining 
Even though there is no legal provision under state law or in Ti-
tle 18 of the U.S. Code the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(rules issued by the Supreme Court and approved by the Congress) 
 
 20. Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice. 
 21. Id.  
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they do however define plea agreement, which is, in essence, the 
same as plea bargaining.22 Despite being also limited to the sphere of 
federal crimes, such rules serve only as a legal basis or doctrinal 
foundation. In fact, there is a manifest rule to prohibit the participa-
tion of the judge in the negotiation. “The court must not participate in 
these discussions.”23 However, in practice, the participation of the 
judge is unambiguous with respect to the cases resolved at the state 
level. 
From this informal negotiation, only two situations may occur: 
1) There is consensus on the proposal: In this case, the 
defender consults the defendant (who is usually under arrest 
in the same building and waiting in a nearby room) or, if 
free on bond, out in the hallway or a conference room to de-
termine whether he agrees to the presented conditions. If the 
defendant agrees, then the formal right (in a hearing to be 
held afterwards) of pleading guilty will take place. 
 
2) There is no consensus on the proposal: Strictly, dis-
sent marks the beginning of the instruction of the legal pro-
cess for further judgment. However, plea bargaining is the 
ultimate destination for almost all of the cases that are 
brought before the court. A lack of agreement is usually on-
ly in practice a postponement for a supervening negotiation. 
Plea bargaining can recur at any time, even during the jury 
trial. 
In the early stage of my fieldwork, the judge received me with 
great kindness and said “if plea bargaining is what you are looking 
for, this is the right place.”24 While we were sitting in his chambers, 
the judge pulled a chair and placed it next to him. After a few 
minutes, he initiated the possibility of negotiations, which were pre-
sented by the prosecutor. First, he introduced me to all of the assistant 
district attorneys and defenders present, highlighting my position as 
observer. After the completion of the backstage negotiations and a 
 
 22. See, FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11. 
 23. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 11. 
 24. Interview with Judge “J”, Cal. Hall of Justice. 
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brief pause granted by the judge, all of the participants headed to the 
courtroom. Strictly, all of the defenders had already consulted their 
clients regarding the proposals prior.  
The courtroom proceedings were nothing more than the formal 
approval of the negotiation; in some cases there was an agreement, 
but for the others, there was a postponement.25 The judge called the 
defendants (one by one) to warn and inquire as to whether the de-
fendant was aware of the consequences of the declaration of guilt. 
The judge pronounced the sentence before the formal acceptance. 
c.  Common Sense and the Plea Bargain 
The nationally known journalist, Morley Safer, who leads the 
television program 60 Minutes interviewed the Attorney General of 
Rhode Island, Arlene Violet.26 Promptly, the interviewer introduced 
his idea about the system, which, according to him, would be com-
mon sense: “One of the blots on the legal landscape in the USA is 
plea bargaining.”27 
At this moment, he simulated in a monologue a conversation be-
tween a District Attorney and a defender: 
I know that my client spanked his partner, who was 50 
years old, during the last 6 weeks. However, if my client 
chooses to declare that he is not guilty and to take the case 
to trial, we will have at least 6 weeks of your time (in addi-
tion of your entire team). However, if he declares guilty, he 
will obtain a lighter indictment. Let us reach an agreement. 
Give him three months [in prison]. [...] Is this not what hap-
pens in most cases?28 
In turn, Arlene Violet rebated without hesitation: 
 
 25. The (re)scheduling of the hearings drew attention due to its transparency and informal-
ity. Everything was done by consensus (the consent of all participants was indispensa-
ble).  
 26. See CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN 
CALIFORNIA 129 (1993) (Interview by Morley Safer with Arlene Violet, Attorney Gen-
eral of Rhode Island). 
 27. Id.   
 28. Id.  
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No! Plea bargaining is just a blot that ignores the quality 
of justice: there is no balance between plea bargaining and 
what actually happened in the case. If you bring me a case 
and if you are honest, you will sit down and say, ‘Arlene, 
here is the proof that I have for my case, and here are my 
weaknesses. And the role of the data is such and such.’ I 
will look deep in your eyes and say, ‘I disagree with you on 
this, this, and this. We have this body of evidence.’ Thus, 
we will try to obtain what justice does in these cases. That is 
what plea bargaining does.29 
The dialogue in the interview portrays the tension between the 
opinions from “those of the outside” and “those of the inside.”30 From 
the external perception, something is notorious: negotiation, in prac-
tice, sacrifices quality for quantity, i.e., for justice to demonstrate, in 
absolute numbers, its efficiency. In contrast, the ones involved in the 
process see plea bargaining as a legal and ethical process that is well-
structured according to the known methods that will lead to negotia-
tion.31 
It is worth mentioning that the biggest problem, in the words of 
the Attorney General, is “ignoring the fact that negotiations are rarely 
performed by clearing things up.”32 In fact, the opposite normally oc-
curs. In this study, the connection between plea bargaining and the 
trial itself remains clear. In the beginning, some of the strategies that 
would be eventually released in the trial are anticipated. This interlac-
ing shows my assertion. To clear up a matter during the negotiation 
phase would anticipate what you have on hand for a future judgment, 
which would be suicide for any party. Thus, the opposite is observed. 
In the field, what we often see is a game of “bluffs” because one at-
tempts to show strength and thus hides some cards up one’s sleeve. 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. MCCOY, supra note 26, at 129-30. 
 32. Id. 
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d.  Plea Bargaining and Juridical-Religious Culture in the 
U.S. 
The admission of guilt from an accused person has been around 
since ancient times. What seems to be something more recent, at least 
in the context of law in the U.S., is the wide use of the declaration of 
guilt by the accused to avoid a trial, which allows immediate punish-
ment. Although it has existed since the Middle Ages in England (and, 
consequently, in the American colonial period),33 its wide use appears 
to be precocious. 
The idea of confession, regret, and forgiveness appears to always 
be linked to local religious rituals.34 Consequently, it would be diffi-
cult to say that the religious traces in a given society would be sepa-
rated from the way the society addresses the adjustment of local 
law.35 In the U.S., which is a nation with a very striking Protestant 
tradition, it is not difficult to notice the intermingling between these 
issues. Vincent Crapanzano performed interesting fieldwork in his 
investigation of the connection between the courtroom and the pulpit 
ritual,36 more specifically the relationship between the bench and the 
pulpit. Crapanzano, as the very title of his study suggests, focuses on 
the attachment to the word literalism and denotes the transparency in 
the two forms of ritual, i.e. legal and religious.37 Moreover, this 
transparency38 gives legitimacy to the process. 
 
 33. See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 43 
(1979). 
 34. See VINCENT CRAPANZANO, SERVING THE WORD: LITERALISM IN AMERICA FROM THE 
PULPIT TO THE BENCH (2000). 
 35. Id.  
36. It is interesting to note the differentiation in the treatment given by the ethnographer to 
both environments: “The reader must have noticed the discrepancy between my chap-
ters on Fundamentalism and those on Law. I treat Fundamentalists in a more gentle 
way compared to lawyers and judges, with whom I am engaged in a more heated ar-
gument. [.  ] I find that Fundamentalists have, for their salvation, sacrificed and con-
demned aspects of social and cultural life from which I gain a sense of meaning, satis-
faction, and pleasure. [.  ]. I liked many of the Fundamentalists I came to know. I did 
not really become friends with any of them—I couldn’t.” Id. at 324, 328. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 238. “Transparency” must not be confused with the public character of the pro-
cess, as occurs in Brazil. The important thing is to know how the negotiation is publi-
cized. The publication in the Official Gazette (Diário Oficial) does not grant transpar-
ency to the legal practices. The document is public, but there is no transparency. 
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This link is found, for example, in the most important symbols of 
both rituals: the Constitution and the Bible.39 Many Americans con-
struct a relationship between the Constitution and the Bible as divine 
providence.40 The American president Abraham Lincoln used to ask 
the Americans to embrace the principle of “reverence to the laws” as 
the “political religion of the nation.”41 A judge of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the 1920’s faithfully believed that the Consti-
tution, as well as the Sacred Scripture, was a “legal instrument that 
was divinely inspired.”42 There are those who believe that there is a 
representation of the Bible’s holy trinity in the symbols of the Ameri-
can nation: 1) the Constitution, 2) the Declaration of Independence, 
and 3) the Flag of the U.S.43 According to Professor Vincent 
Crapanzano, the symbolism of these issues is clear: 
Moreover, American political and social understanding is 
continually articulated in and through religious, primarily 
Christian, symbols. That these symbols should be taken at 
face value, as indicative of heartfelt belief rather than rhe-
torically, as potentially moving conventions of oratory, is it-
self symptomatic of the literalism I am trying to delineate in 
this book.44  
The civil religion has become an emblem of the social identity of 
the American people, which is rooted in the social ideology.45 
Moreover, at the heart of this religious reality, the delineating 
principles of the declaration of guilt of the accused are inserted. Un-
like Catholicism, in which the confession is secretive and performed 
before the religious leader (the representative of God), pleading 
guilty one sees a need of making the regret public, through the repre-
sentation of the testimony, before the society, that the criminal act to 
which one is charged is worthy of a punitive response.46 Neverthe-
 
 39. CRAPANZANO, supra note 34, at 230.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. CRAPANZANO, supra note 34,  at 230-31.  
 45. Id. at 231. 
 46. Id. at 70.  
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less, precisely because of this regret, the punishment is mitigated with 
another typical symbolism of religious tradition—forgiveness.47  
This is a nodal point of this system. It is as if there was a pre-
stipulated condition for the negotiation. Similar to how there is a need 
of regret (which, in itself, is already a penitence) for the effectiveness 
of prayer to reach God, in the legal ambit there exists the need for the 
declaration of guilt to possess the postulating ability for bargaining, 
i.e., of remission of punishment (whether partial or total remission).48 
One of the differences with respect to this point is that the confes-
sion—at the juridical level—is independent of the moral value of 
honesty and sincerity because it is the society itself that does not ap-
pear to give “sacred” relevance to such values.49 
Contrary to what occurs in the United States, the maintenance of 
order in Brazil comes from the concealment of the conflict.50 In 
American law, the negotiation, as observed in the institute of plea 
bargaining, is made public (regarding the forms of guilt and truth).51 
Hence, it is necessary to make the comparison through confrontation 
and not similarity because mixing a system of consensus with a sys-
tem of dissent is the heart of the problem, whether it is accusatory 
(where charges are public) or inquisitorial (where charges are written 
and secretive).52 
e. The Non-Existence of a Legal Basis for Plea Bargaining 
It would be difficult to understand plea bargaining without un-
derstanding a little-studied phenomenon (even in the legal literature 
in the U.S.): the figure of the prosecutor. As we will find, its genesis 
does not have any similarity with what the Brazilian legal culture un-
 
 47. Id. at 73.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AMER. L. ECON. 
REV. 227 (2002), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/shavell/pdf/4_Amer_Law_Econ_Rev_227.pdf.  
 50. Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the 
United States, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1601, 1618 (Oct. 1996).  
 51. How Courts Work, ABA (2016), 
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derstands as public ministry. In a controversial, but well accepted, 
study, Allen Steinberg53 intended to demonstrate that the image of a 
public prosecutor, which is a representative of the people, has been 
around since 1920.54 He stressed that the majority of Americans, 
when thinking about the operation of the prosecution (District Attor-
ney), already have in mind a public figure that represents an inde-
pendent power and has a high power of discretion, which leads many 
authors to state that prosecutors have more power than the judges 
themselves.55 
In contrast, he stated that this public representative has mysteri-
ous origins with very few notes prior to the year 1880. In a previous 
period, the figure of the private prosecutor prevailed because a citizen 
always initiated criminal causes.56 During the greater part of the nine-
teenth century, the criminal system had, as a root, a relationship of 
voluntarism among the citizen (pursuer) and the judiciary.57 In addi-
tion, this volunteerism means nothing more than the discretion in-
volved due to the private nature of this relationship.58 
Therefore, on the question of private prosecution, the important 
thing is to realize through the study that this discretion is “trans-
ferred” to the current figure of the District Attorney.59 Proof of this 
transference is that the District Attorney is elected.60 In Brazil, due to 
the principle of obligation, this discretion does not exist. Even in 
those cases in which the principle of obligation does not exist any-
more, this does not occur in the same manner. Moreover, it is precise-
ly because they are elected that these individuals should be held ac-
 
 53. Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, 
the District Attorney, and American Legal History, CRIME & DELINQUENCY 568, 592 
(1984).  
 54. Howard S. Gans, The Public Prosecutor: His Powers, Temptations, and Limitations, 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 120, 132 (May 1973).  
 55. Steinberg, supra note 53. 
 56. John Lea, Courts and Prosecution In Nineteenth Century (2003), 
http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/history/36807.htm.  
 57. Unraveling the Concept of Volunteer Policing, UNIV. PITTSBURGH PRESS 1, 5 (2005). 
 58. Id. at 12.  
 59. Are There Limits to Prosecutorial Discretion, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Jan. 1, 2003), 
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countable for their actions; the understanding of the institution of ac-
countability is paramount to the understanding of the main differ-
ences between the two systems. 
In this sense, Vera Ribeiro de Almeida authoritatively observes 
the following: 
Even if one defends that the negotiation was imported 
from this model, as among us there is no mechanism of ac-
countability, our prosecutors keep acting in accordance with 
the authority that each one judges having, without such 
choices being permitted by law or any concern about the fu-
ture responsibility of such choices.61 
In Brazil, the state is the one who holds justice in its hands. The 
King is the Emperor. These differences in origin demonstrate how 
these systems are anchored in different places. Therefore, it is no co-
incidence that the identification of plea bargaining is linked to this 
feature of discretion, which does not occur in Brazil. 
Even though the declaration of guilt had already appeared in the 
American colonial period, its effects were very diverse. The literature 
suggests that these declarations were relatively rare and treated with 
suspicion. The declaration of guilt, notably with felony crimes that 
deserved more severe punishment, often led to the execution of the 
accused; as a result judges themselves were suspicious that the ac-
cused acted as a result of coercion or of misinformation. For this rea-
son, the judges prompted the defendants to exercise their rights asso-
ciated with trial proceedings. 
The concept of plea bargaining—the negotiation between the 
prosecution and the defenders with the purpose of promoting the dec-
laration of guilt aimed at bargaining—was an unknown practice in 
the U.S. until the nineteenth century.62 Before this period, cases tried 
by jury were generally decided more quickly, without significant re-
gard for formal evidence examination and procedure.63 It was com-
mon for lawyers to represent both parties in the same dispute. More-
 
 61. Vera Ribeiro de Almeida, Transação Penal e Penas Alternativas: Uma Pesquisa 
Empírica nos Juizados Especiais Criminais no Rio de Janeiro (2012) (unpublished 
dissertation, Universidade Gama Filho) (on file with author). 
 62. Steinberg, supra note 53, at 584-85. 
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over, no catalysts existed to promote the development of a plea bar-
gaining system before the nineteenth century.64 The change in these 
characteristics led to the first movements in favor of such an institu-
tion. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. was faced 
with a sudden change from a system of trials to a plea bargaining sys-
tem, which was already the most widely used method of conflict 
resolution.65 
In this analysis, we return to the initial idea of plea bargaining 
regulation. This transformation was neither the result of an introduc-
tion of, or changes in, the legislation, nor the result of a formal crea-
tion of rules by the judiciary itself—something usually observed in 
the U.S., notably by the Supreme Court.66 According to legal schol-
ars, the adoption of this transformation originated in large part from 
the response of the prosecutor to the excess of cases submitted to the 
judicial branch.67 
The increase in its use occurred especially because of the usual 
(and expected) causes present in the modification of the rituals of the 
judiciary in various parts of the world. In other words, the increases 
in both the population and the crime rates spurred the increase.68 In 
addition, the increase in the complexity of trials by jury and the pro-
fessionalization of criminal justice favored the rise in the use of plea 
bargaining. Plea bargaining became the D.A.’s first attempt at a solu-
tion to legal disputes, because the D.A. did not have enough time and 
resources to monitor every case that went to trial.69 
It is remarkable that, through field research, I was able to ob-
serve that plea bargaining is a necessity for many practitioners as a 
condition on the sound functioning of justice. As soon as I ap-
proached one of the operators, and showed my interest in performing 
a comparative research study about the system, the burning question 
on their minds was, “How does plea bargaining work in Brazil?” 
My reply was ready and immediate: “We have not, in Brazilian 
criminal proceedings, an institution that has a similarity plausible to 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 584. 
 66. Id. at 585. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 572. 
 69. Steinberg, supra note 53, at 585. 
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the point to finding similar categories; we have, only, figures with 
links that may bring about a confronting research.” Later in the con-
versation, I only made a brief reference to our penal negotiation—
even though the two systems share more differences than similarities. 
However, the following inquiry—loaded with an obvious strange-
ness/irony—arises: “However, how do you, then, judge all the cas-
es?” 
In principle, this question brings forth a twofold analysis: (1) 
who are the subjects that reveal this inquiry/strangeness; and (2) what 
this question informs us in the foreground. With regards to the first 
analysis I can state that to my surprise, I noticed this inquiry in all 
sectors of society, including outside the milieu of legal practitioners. 
This question was the main area of interest for the vast majority of 
judges, defenders, engineers, and civil servants. This first point of 
analysis lends itself to the second point of examination. The question, 
and therefore the perception, of plea bargaining is not limited to ac-
tors in the legal system. Generally, it is common knowledge that the 
existence of plea bargaining arose from pragmatic concerns. In prin-
ciple, it is not better or worse, but rather the solution that was found, 
either if it is palliative or already definitive in U.S. society. It was as 
if my American interlocutor wanted to ask me, “How does your mod-
el work without the existence of plea bargaining?” Some of the inter-
viewed individuals even came to their own immediate conclusions: “I 
suppose that the number of judges in Brazil is large.” 
Of course, the absence of an immediate solution to cope with this 
method is not the only reason for the “success” of this powerful pro-
cedure for penal prosecution. Several other reasons corroborate this 
situation, which incidentally, was one of the main objects of study in 
my research. Without prejudice to the subsequent detailed analysis, I 
have recently heard of an academic who appeared at the university in 
which I was doing my research, who stated a phrase that introduced 
another characteristic of great relevance in the U.S., and is also one 
of the fundamental aspects of plea bargaining: the adversarial system. 
The idea of a solution to the dispute as part of a game between 
opposite opponents, which have a thirst for victory, lead the above-
mentioned scholar to allude to the words of a famous football coach 
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speaking on victory: “Winning is not everything; it is the only 
thing.”70   
Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that denote 
not only a relationship—as could be seen at first—with the solution 
to the disputes found in trials, but also to the negotiation of plea bar-
gaining. The bargain is also negotiated in a behind the scenes arena, 
which is typical of the adversarial system. For this reason, I asked 
Judge “J” what he would alter in the institution of plea bargaining. 
Showing surprise, he replied: 
Well, I had never thought about it ... Well, I believe that 
the reason for the existence of plea bargaining - and I think 
that you have already realized this - is that, with 15,000 ar-
rests (for felonies) per year in San Francisco, we would only 
be able to judge [referring to trial] approximately 700 per 
year. That is, we must eliminate these cases in some way. If 
this did not happen ... well, you must be aware through the 
newspapers of the budget cuts to our court. Well, even in 
our best [financial] season, it would be impossible for us to 
take the majority of the cases to trial. It is necessary to have 
plea bargaining... or there would not be a criminal system ... 
particularly in San Francisco. Theoretically speaking, the 
aim of the institution is to punish the accused. The other 
purpose is to ‘clean the agenda’ to allow the trial of those 
cases that are really necessary. Thus, bearing in mind that 
the purpose is to reduce the number of cases, if I could 
change the law, I would amend it to enable plea bargaining 
during trials. But, as I have already said, this only happens 
in San Francisco. Another change that I would make is the 
following: I believe that, in the negotiations that occur be-
fore the preliminary hearing (only between the parties), only 
two or three experienced District Attorneys should be cho-
sen for all cases. They should not be very strict and con-
servative Attorneys.71 
 
 70. Beau Dure, Winning Isn’t Everything; It’s the Only Thing. Right?, GUARDIAN (Sep. 24, 
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f. Pleading Guilty and the Path to the Bargain Discretion 
It is important to notice, in advance, that the approval of plea 
bargaining by the Supreme Court of the United States did not intro-
duce any innovation in relation to plead guilty in itself, i.e., with re-
gards to the statement of guilt.72 It always existed and had (and still 
has) its various functions within the American judicial model.73 The 
innovative and formal approval by the Supreme Court stressed that 
the American Constitution does not impose an obstacle to plea bar-
gaining.74 In other words, what took place was the formal cementing 
of one more facet of pleading guilty. It would also be the “bargaining 
chip” for plea bargaining. The accused must declare himself/herself 
guilty as a sine qua non condition to have the opportunity to bargain. 
The bargain is not only limited to the intention of reducing the penal-
ty to be imposed, as might appear through a first analysis. It goes 
well beyond this. From the moment in which the accused declares 
himself/herself guilty, the negotiating parties (here, as will be ob-
served hereafter, we can include the judge) establish the highest de-
gree of discretion.75 
I also asked Judge “J” about this discretion, especially its limits, 
and obtained the following answer: 
Yes, the District Attorney has full discretion with regards 
to the accusation. In addition, once indictment is formulat-
ed, it can be modified at any time. In fact, I remember that, 
at the time when I was a defender, I participated in an inter-
esting case in which the defendant was accused of murder 
and I lead a negotiation for modifying the indictment to dis-
turbing the peace, which is a low-relevance crime. And I 
think that this happened for a reason. Often the police do not 
have conviction that the accused actually committed the 
crime. When the District Attorney realizes that he will not 
 
 72. Jenia I. Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 
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obtain conviction of the criminal practice even by frighten-
ing the defendant, he needs to give some type of answer. 
Thus, he eventually chooses the crime which, in my view, 
would be the “minor” existing offense [disturbing the 
peace].76 
However, when I asked about the mythicizing of the judge’s 
neutrality in this process, he said: 
The judge fully has the final word. Well, there are differ-
ent philosophies among judges, but clearly, if the judge does 
not like the offer, he can just not accept it. For example, the 
judge who preceded me often left aside the negotiations that 
would occur previously. In all these years, I have only done 
this once. I have another philosophy. If the District Attorney 
and the public defender arrived at an agreement [...] They 
are well aware of the case. The defender knows well what is 
best for the accused, and the District Attorney is aware of 
what would be the best option for society.77 
Moreover, we can see one of the most striking characteristics of 
plea bargaining in this statement. In one of my first visits to the 
judge’s chamber (where the prior negotiation occurred, in the manner 
described at the beginning of this work), I realized that, when the 
prosecutor, the lawyer, and the judge start the negotiation (assuming 
that there was a possibility of a declaration of guilt), there was a large 
opening regarding the “destination” of the accused. I realized that it 
was very common to “choose” the legal classification of the commit-
ted crime. In other words, even if they were all certain that there was 
a crime of drug trafficking, it would be possible to stipulate that the 
defendant would be charged with the crime of possession of drugs 
and, therefore, receive a punishment that was compatible and propor-
tional with the stipulated practice (and not performed!). The prosecu-
tion, therefore, will be formulated by a symbolic fact, which is “cre-
ated” by means of a negotiation. Indeed, a German judge said the 
following in an interview: “[P]lea bargaining can weaken the duty of 
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the judge to investigate the ‘truth of the facts’ [...] the judge has a 
smaller chance of checking the basis of the [facts].”78 
On the negotiating table, the penal code does not serve as a pa-
rameter for the suitability of the practiced conduct but as a range of 
options that serves as a helm for the choice (pick up) of the punish-
ment to be applied. 
Conversely, in Brazil, the first steps in the theory of criminal law 
already show us that one of the basic principles of the law (it is not 
just about the criminal sphere) is the legality.79 Both the Constitution 
and the penal code stipulate that there will be no crime if the law does 
not previously set the conduct that is eventually practiced; in addi-
tion, there will be no punishment without prior legal application.80 
This is a principle under which various decisions are made. 
I was once struck with an interesting comparison: the idea of 
plea bargaining is the same as that of “grade bargaining,” i.e., a nego-
tiation between a teacher and a student. Let us suppose that a school 
assignment has been submitted to the teacher and, after a brief look at 
the first page, the teacher tells the student that, if he would carefully 
read the entire work and apply his usual strict rules, he would most 
likely decide to grant it a “D” grade. However, if the student relin-
quished his right to have his work meticulously examined and con-
sciously criticized, the professor would agree to grant it a “B” grade. 
Considering that the student gives precedence for the general average 
of grades—and less precedence to learning and the justice of the 
grade—the satisfied student accepts the “B” grade, and the teacher is 
satisfied with the reduction in their workload.81 
Although the illustration is interesting, it does not correspond 
faithfully to what occurs in plea bargaining, particularly in relation to 
one of its premises. First, in the illustration, the professor would have 
a dual role, which is to say, prosecutor and judge. Second, in the ex-
ample given, the teacher already predetermines that a well-
 
 78. Turner, supra note 72, at 225. 
79. Andrey B. de Mendonca, The Criminal Justice System in Brazil: A Brief Account, 
RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES NO. 63, 92, 
http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No92_07PA_Andrey2.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2016). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 104-05 (1976). 
A Comparative Empirical Study of Negotiation Vol. IV, No. II 
 81 
established analysis (i.e., a trial) would imply a lower grade (i.e., a 
high/rigorous penalty). This predetermination (at least in the manner 
of this illustration), however, does not exist in plea bargaining, espe-
cially if we bear in mind that, although the punishment is stipulated 
by the judge, it will be the task of the jury (which is not included in 
the negotiation) to “tell the ‘truth’ of the facts.”82 
In the academic seats of university degree courses in Law, we 
have already learned the old adage (formalized in the Constitution) 
according to which the citizen might do (or fail to do) everything that 
the law does not prohibit, whereas the public man can only achieve 
what is expressly defined by the rule of law. In the U.S., we observe 
something quite different. The idea of discretion by the police officer 
is commonplace in American society, which accepts it (to a certain 
extent).83 One academically84 learns that discretion may imply the ig-
noring of minor offenses (expressly provided by the law). In a core 
work of the American criminal system, I have expressly read that 
“the lower the severity of the offense, the greater the freedom that the 
police has to ignore it.”85 In addition, George Cole adds that even po-
liteness can be a determining factor in discretion: “[. . .] a suspect that 
demonstrates respect for the officer has a lower probability of being 
arrested than he who in the opposite manner.”86 Or, as said by Ben-
jamin Franklin: “Laws too gentle are seldom obeyed; too severe, sel-
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dom executed.”87 I would like to emphasize that this is not, therefore, 
a “corrupt” act of the local authority. The explicit nature of such 
practices is a consequence of the natural social acceptance of the acts. 
Moreover, it is also true that this social acceptance strengthens the 
character of transparency. 
In the normative field, one also sees this transparency: the ex-
pression discretion appears seventy-seven times in the California Pe-
nal Code, which regulates a great diversity of subjects.88  In the same 
line of reasoning, plea bargaining also represents the portrait of this 
possibility of resolving the dispute without being tied to the rules of 
legal application. I began this section with the phrase “This is the best 
thing I can do for him.”89 It is with the same transparency and infor-
mality that “plea bargain” negotiations are held. 
FIELD WORK IN BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
(CRIMINAL NEGOTIATION) 
As I have repeatedly noted, our aim is to understand the func-
tioning of the bodies of the judiciary branch in both countries, start-
ing from the premise that they are universes with substantial differen-
tiation in their juridical cultures. Therefore, it is essential to conduct 
the proper contextualization of each one of these situations. Only 
with the contradictions, the dissents, and the consensus (appropriately 
contextualized) will it be possible to perform a comparison of the dif-
ferences because, when we talk about comparison, we are thinking 
about the differences between the institutions of each system, which 
uses the comparative method by contrasts. This sets apart the possi-
bility of conducting a comparison by similarity, which would lead to 
the erroneous conclusion that the institution of the most diverse legal 
cultures are equal and differentiated only by subtle characteristics. 
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a. The Necessary Contextualization of Brazilian Juridical 
Culture and Criminal Negotiation 
Contrary to the U.S. system, we find that the Brazilian legal cul-
ture arises from and follows a significantly different path. Prior to an-
alyzing these topics in more depth, it is relevant to describe the re-
markable characteristics associated with the mistaken legal theory 
tradition about the topic in Brazil. First, the Brazilian juridical litera-
ture considers that the due process of law has an identity between the 
two countries, which consequently forces us to arise from a mistaken 
premise of the theme.90 Second, the juridical theory in Brazil asserts 
that the negotiation brings the unequivocal and strong heritage of law 
practiced in the U.S. regarding the institute of plea bargaining.91 
We do not mean to make a value judgment of the objects that are 
being compared. There will not be a value analysis toward which law 
is better or worse. However, it is important to make it clear that the 
two systems have characteristics that are substantially different as a 
direct result of belonging to different juridical systems and according 
to the culture of the States to which they belong. For this reason, in 
an equivocal way, one of these systems is segmented into parts such 
that these are incorporated into our or any other system with the pur-
pose of supposedly ‘improving’ one of them. However, the effects of 
this transplantation become unpredictable and results in little enlight-
ening for the undertaken comparison. 
b. The Field Working Space 
Unlike in the U.S., Brazil’s legislation regarding the subject is 
federal and, therefore, enjoys validity throughout the national territo-
ry. It is important to clarify this point, having in mind that my obser-
 
 90. The theme discusses the interesting research in which the decontextualization sets 
aside the attempt to make the comparison through similarities between the mentioned 
institutions. MARCO AURÉLIO GONÇALVES, DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL: UM ESTUDO 
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vation on American courts only involved the judicial practices of the 
State of California. 
As discussed in the previous section, each state creates its own 
legislation in criminal matters and thus leaves the responsibility of 
disciplining a few crimes (and their respective procedures) of nation-
al repercussion to the federal sphere.92 In contrast, I remember that 
the institution of plea-bargaining is used in a very similar way in the 
more diverse areas of the country. In Brazil, the matter is governed in 
a generic way by the Federal Constitution in Article 98(I), which dis-
cusses the creation of “special courts, filled by magisterial judges, or 
magistrates and lay people, competent for the conciliation, trial, and 
execution of civil causes of lower complexity and penal offenses of 
minor offensive potential, by means of oral and abbreviated proce-
dures, allowed, in the cases provided by law, the negotiation and the 
trial of resources by groups of judges of first degree.”93 
However, the Law 9.099/95 is the only regulation that institutes 
conciliation and criminal negotiation.94 Therefore, this legislation is 
applied throughout the national territory. The scope of my observa-
tion, however, was limited to Special Criminal Courts of the Metro-
politan Region of Vitória-ES, where I observed conciliation and 
criminal negotiation hearings and conducted some interviews with 
the actors involved in this process. 
c. Two Distinct and Poorly Understood Moments: 
Conciliation and Criminal Negotiation 
I must preliminarily highlight that the objective of this work is 
not to perform a review of the legislation that regulates the Special 
Criminal Courts; it is a matter of fieldwork in two judicial systems to 
perform a comparison exercise. The intentions are to ascertain the 
differences between negotiations in the criminal ambit made in Brazil 
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and in the U.S. and, mainly, to identify the disparities between what 
the law says and what actually occurs in practice. 
As outlined in the previous section, there is a legal-specific dis-
cipline regarding plea-bargaining. It is an explicitly informal practice 
and a quality that the practitioners of law do not make any issue in 
denying. The following are characteristics of this practice in the U.S.: 
(1) There is no predefined time for its occurrence; (2) there is no spe-
cific location for the negotiation (except for its ratification); (3) the 
judge does not necessarily participate in the negotiation (this will de-
pend on each judge); (4) it can be applied, virtually, for all crimes; 
(5) it generally requires an admission of guilt by the accused; and (6) 
there is an incomparable discretion on the part of the District Attor-
ney.95  
In contrast, in Brazil, the matter is governed by law and contains 
several details. Within the framework of this research, two points are 
crucial: (1) To establish the main differences between both systems 
and (2) to verify whether the judicial practices correspond to what is 
regulated by the law. It is thus necessary to first acknowledge that 
there are two distinct and sometimes poorly understood specific 
points in time (during the process), especially in informal practices. 
In Article 72, the statute 9.099/95, which addresses the mixing of 
the civil and criminal fields, establishes the possibility of having a 
negotiation regarding damages (civil sphere) in criminal proceed-
ings.96 Until the advent of Special Criminal Courts, these two spheres 
never communicated (except for the purposes of binding decisions, in 
certain cases).97 At this point, there is an apparent difference to plea-
bargaining, through which we are not considering civil matters (at 
least as a general rule). 
It should therefore be clear that the term conciliation is limited to 
the possible legal settlement (regarding civil damages). It is important 
to stress this because Article 73 of the statute states that the judge or 
the conciliator shall conduct the hearing.98 Throughout my field ob-
servations, I never observed a judge conducting a conciliation. More-
 
 95. See supra Section II. 
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 97. CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 98(I) (Braz.); Edilenice Passos, 
Doing Legal Research in Brazil, HAUSER GLOBAL L. SCH. (Feb. 2005). 
 98. CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 74 (Braz.). 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 86 
over, at this point, a problem arises: Article 74 states that, in cases of 
private criminal action or conditional to representation, the agreement 
(in other words, the civil settlement) entails a waiver in the criminal 
sphere.99 
In other words, in judicial practice, the judge does not participate 
in these cases. In one of my comments, I sought to determine the sig-
nificance of the expression “under her guidance” in the view of the 
judge. In response to my inquiry, she replied: “I never let a concilia-
tion occur without my presence.”100 However, she made it explicitly 
clear that her presence in practice means being in the same court be-
cause reconciliations occur in another room, without any supervision. 
Still in the same court, when I insisted on the procedure, the 
prosecutor said the following: 
The conciliator is a lay judge and, therefore, an appendix 
of the magistrate. He only does a hearing to attempt a con-
ciliation, but all the resolutions taken at such hearings need 
to subsequently pass through the sieve of the judge and the 
Public Ministry. No conciliation passes outside of these of-
fices [except, of course, in the hypothesis that the presence 
of a member of the D.A. is not required].101 
I realized, however, that the practice was very different. After 
the conciliation hearing, the conciliator was limited to the minutes 
signed by the judge. 
When interviewing a conciliator, I heard the following state-
ment: “I act as prosecutor.”102 In practice, as realized through my 
field research, conciliation plays a significant role in the large and 
vast majority of cases (in both private criminal action and conditional 
to representation) and, therefore, could cause an extinction of pun-
ishment. In other words, contrary to what the law provides, the “solu-
 
 99. There are no “private criminal actions” in the U.S. All criminal matters have to be 
brought by the government, either state or federal prosecutors; although some may re-
quire a complaint signed by the victim. CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] 
art. 73 (Braz.). 
 100. Interview with Judge, Special Criminal Court, Braz.  
 101. Interview with Prosecutor, Braz. 
 102. Interview with Conciliator, Special Criminal Court, Braz. 
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tion” given by the criminal sphere occurred without the presence of 
the judge and the public prosecutor. 
Let us see another facet of history. The purpose of this statute 
was the resolution of criminal issues through legal civil settlements 
(what we could call “civilization” of the criminal procedure).103 Dur-
ing the field observation, I noticed that, in almost all cases, there is no 
actual civil agreement regarding damages. Instead, there is an inter-
ference of the conciliator that points out that the best solution is to 
“forget everything.” Statistically, this is of great value to the courts. 
Even the judge did not have knowledge of this process, but the result 
will still be considered as a “solved lawsuit.” 
During the course of this field observation, there were rare mo-
ments, which I observed the conciliator proposing a legal settlement 
regarding civil damages. In these cases, the conciliator functioned as 
a mediator by stating that the best result would be “a change in be-
havior” and always emphasized that it was a criminal court not a ren-
dering to a “process of knowledge” with respect to any debts. In a 
conversation with one of the conciliators, she made it clear that she 
operates more as a psychologist than as an individual who dictates 
statute 9.099/95. She added that, in the recent months, she had 
reached a 100% success rate regarding the agreements. She then ex-
plained the reason for this success and said that, in fact, what the vic-
tim wants, at least, is to see the accused be obliged to attend the hear-
ing “to suffer as he deserves,” as stated one of the victims. 
In another hearing104 in which I participated, the woman who 
was accompanying the threatened party said the following: “Does he 
end up in jail?” and the conciliatory replied: “No, in Brazil, he does 
not end up in jail.” She also mentioned the following: “This means 
that if a person does not pay the other, [he] does not end up in jail.” 
Every factor indicated that they were there for much more than a 
debt. The companion of the threatened party thought that criminal 
judgment would be competent to examine all of the issues involved 
in the matter, including the non-payment of any severance payment. 
For them, it was a single thing. They expected that the accused would 
be arrested due to the debt owed as well as the threat made. 
 
 103. CONSTITUÇAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 74 (Braz.); 9.099/95 de CÓDIGO 
PENAL (Brazilian Penal Code); Silva, supra note 94. 
 104. This was an indictment of threatening and personal injury. 
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According to the conciliator, almost 100% of the people who 
participate reach an agreement, which indicates that people are satis-
fied with simply the presence of the accused in the conciliation hear-
ing and/or that the victim does not know what will happen if there is 
no will to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, I repeat that the term 
“waiver” is rarely used during hearings because the conciliator is lim-
ited to affirming that the best solution is to “forget everything such 
that everyone may live in peace.” 
I asked this same conciliator whether the solution could be 
through a manifest waiver. She denied and said that what happens is 
a real conciliation. In all the minutes she drafted, however, the waiver 
was expressively provided in Article 107 of the Brazilian Penal 
Code.105 
We have addressed cases of conciliation for the civil settlement 
which, in practice, leads to the extinction of the process. However, I 
have realized that the judicial practices in criminal negotiations also 
differ from what the law stipulates. Moreover, I recall that the partic-
ipation of the conciliator, according to the law, is confined to the 
stage of legal settlement regarding civil damages, not in the criminal 
negotiation stage. 
In the interlude of one of the conciliations, I asked one of concil-
iators if she also participated in the criminal negotiation. Her answer 
was the following: “I participate. I do it. However, now I want to stop 
doing it because I eventually do everything alone.”106 
In other words, all of the hearings, whether conciliations or crim-
inal negotiations, are conducted exclusively by the conciliator. Judges 
and prosecutors only sign the minutes. In practice, according to my 
observation, the judge participates only in cases in which the negotia-
tion was frustrated (which is extremely rare) and if evidentiary and 
judgment hearing are necessary. 
d. The Problem of Consensus 
Before the already demonstrated paradox, in which our criminal 
proceedings are ruled by inquisitorial characteristics, it is noticeable 
that part of the doctrine addresses the criminal negotiation as an insti-
 
 105. CÓDIGO PENAL (Brazilian Penal Code) art. 107.  
 106. Interview with Conciliator, Special Criminal Court, Braz. 
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tution derived from plea bargaining and that, above all, includes the 
concept of consensus. Lets look at an example of the Brazilian doc-
trine: 
Various European juridical systems, inspired by the US 
system of plea bargaining, have adopted innovative solu-
tions with the aim of reaching a quicker and more effective 
Criminal Justice in answer to the concerns of the communi-
ty. (...). The Brazilian legislator, with the publication of Law 
9,099, introduced, for the first time in our criminal system-
atics, Special Criminal Courts with important innovations, 
such as the conditional suspension of the proceedings and 
the criminal negotiation, thereby fulfilling the precept of art. 
98 I of the Federal Constitution of 1988, and eventually en-
gaged in the formulation of a consensual Criminal Justice, 
slackening that highly repressive characteristic in relation to 
offenses of small and medium severity; thus, it put into 
practice one of the most advanced programs of depenaliza-
tion in the world (which must not be confused with decrimi-
nalization).107 
Contrary to what it may seem, our model does not have charac-
teristics of consensus. The whole process is conducted in such a 
manner to converge the powers in the hands of the judge. Brazilian 
law does not have the desire to achieve consensus on the facts by es-
tablishing, for example, which facts would be undisputed.108 What 
occurs is a dissent that has no end, at least, in the context of the par-
ties. The dissent is only dissipated when the figure of the judge arises 
and, using his “free conviction,” opts for those facts or evidence that 
lead to an unusual real truth (observed in the exposition of motives of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure itself). 
Even though it is impossible to completely deny the characteris-
tics of consensus on a criminal negotiation, it cannot be stated that 
the criminal negotiation is guided by a new consensual bias in Brazil-
ian law. Within a hierarchical society, in which the contradictory is 
the master line of the process, there is still no space for this consen-
 
 107. MÁRCIO FRANKLIN NOGUEIRA, TRANSAÇÃO PENAL 22 (2003). 
 108. Id. 
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sus. Unlike plea bargaining in the U.S., where there really is a con-
sensus between the parties. As we know, the D.A. initiates legal pro-
ceedings against the defendant. However, D.A., in practice, is situat-
ed in the upper hierarchy. This is because, in Brazil, when one thinks 
of the public, one thinks of the State, hence the hierarchization 
Why? Because, strictly speaking, we have not, in this perspec-
tive, an accusatory system but an inquisitorial one. In the American 
system, there is the figure of the State (judge) and the District Attor-
ney, who is supposed to be the representative of the People. In Brazil, 
both are figures of the State.109 Prosecutors are state tutors of the so-
ciety with public individual interests, although official.110 
In one of the hearings I attended, I heard the following statement 
from a judge (addressing the accused): “Sometimes, it depends on the 
Dr. X [prosecutor] or depends on me [judge]. I think that you Sir 
have to accept it because otherwise it will be worse for you.” In addi-
tion, I have noticed through field research that the agreements are not 
consensual because the parties do not know the real purpose of each 
hearing. The conciliators—the real holders of “power”—want to “get 
rid” of the process. Moreover, to achieve this, they take advantage of 
a rule that is already known in Brazilian legal culture: that the process 
is a problem that one should eliminate. Therefore, in the field obser-
vations, it remains clear that the negotiation is not a result of the con-
sensus between the parties but, above all, is a result of the conduct by 
the magistrate that aims primarily to end the process regardless of the 
costs. 
Thus, contrary to what occurs in the adversarial system where 
the consensus is a remarkable factor, in the Brazilian case we find 
that the negotiation enjoys a masked inquisitorial characteristic.111 
It is distinguished, thus, from the forms of expression of oppos-
ing logics of the production of truth, which are dominant in academic 
and scientific areas and founded in the quest for points of provisional 
consensus on facts that are built through reflection and making the 
different perspectives of those involved explicit in a process of 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. ROBERTO KANT DE LIMA, SENSIBILIDADES JURÍDICAS, SABER E PODER: BASES CULTURAIS 
DE ALGUNS ASPECTOS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA 29 
(2009).  
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demonstrative argumentation, which aims at convincing all legitimate 
parties involved in the process: here, reaching a consensus between 
pairs is essential to validate the knowledge.112 
In the context of criminal negotiation, the judicial practices show 
that the efficiency of the solution of processes prevails over any at-
tempt to maintain the minimum guarantees of a process.113 In reality, 
this is not a process, but rather a means through which the operators 
will eliminate the problem. 
There is a manipulation of information by means of an elite 
communication between the law operators, through which the parties 
are brought to an agreement more frequently through inquisitorial 
reason than by consensus, particularly because one cannot consent to 
something that one poorly comprehends.114 The fallacy of the consen-
sus lies precisely in the fact that there is a false impression of a nego-
tiated solution.115 As a result, there was an end to the process due to a 
camouflaged imposition. 
It is therefore the implementation of informal practices outside 
the formal courtroom environment. One could say, however, that this 
informality also occurs in plea bargaining. Nevertheless, the differ-
ence is precisely its transparency. That is the way the system works; 
it is not camouflaged. There is not even a concern in regulating it. It 
is important to note, however, that there is a significant difference be-
tween the public character of the process (such as the process that oc-
curs in Brazil) and its transparency. It is necessary to understand how 
the negotiation is publicized. The publication in the Official Gazette 
(Diário Oficial) does not grant transparency to the legal practices. 
The document is public, but there is no transparency. In one of the 
hearings I attended, this logic was quite evident in the words of the 
judge: “In your case, the agreement is the best solution because the 
continuation of the process will be much worse for you—and I will 
not give you a new opportunity.” 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In the present work, we proposed to understand the law through 
a compared empirical perspective (Brazil and the U.S.) and per-
formed a thematic delimitation notably within the framework of the 
forms of negotiation in criminal justice in both countries: plea bar-
gaining and criminal negotiation. Because these systems are derived 
from considerably distinct sources, we first sought to contextualize 
them according to their traditions. Thus, we can draw several conclu-
sions from the research. 
(1) Despite all of the emphasis of the American universities in 
transmitting the techniques and developing skills in relation to the ju-
ry trial, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved through plea 
bargaining (97% of the cases brought to justice).116 Although academ-
ia itself admits this prevalence, the course of informal practices fo-
cuses more on jury trial than in the practices of plea bargaining. In-
deed, there is a paradoxical perception of the self-conception that the 
actors involved in the process have regarding their functions and 
what would be more relevant in them. Everyone in general has the 
power to negotiate, but only these actors have the prerogative to ana-
lyze the evidence and require the witnesses to appear in court, alt-
hough under the statistical point of view, what they really do is plea 
bargaining. 
(2) In this context, the trial techniques are not so relevant. On the 
contrary, there is a revelation of the connection between plea bargain-
ing and the trial. It is as if all criminal judicial systems work around 
the idea of consensus, which in turn is best represented by plea bar-
gaining. This would be the main target. 
(3) Trial attorneys are considered the best negotiators due to their 
skill set and therefore often negotiate pleas. The other party foresees 
that going to trial will be a difficult fight. Moreover, the difficulty is 
not necessarily due to the other party having strong evidence, but the 
knowledge that your opponent has technical skills (either from expe-
rience or not) that intimidate you. 
 
 116. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-
after-rulings-on-plea-deals.html?_r=1.  
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 (4) Although it is customarily stated that the role of the judge in 
plea bargaining is mitigated, I noticed that there was no judge who 
gave up that control. I noticed a difference in the degree of relation-
ship between the judge and the parties, and a certain level of interfer-
ence in the agreements. Nevertheless, unlike what is observed in Bra-
zilian law, I have never seen any magistrate who is a mere ratifier of 
agreements. 
(5) In the legal process in the U.S., the truth is built according to 
the rules of consensus between the parties.117 What actually occurred 
is much less important than what is agreed regarding the occurrence 
of the facts. This collides with the Brazilian model in which the 
search for real truth still permeates in the midst of legal theory. 
(6) In Brazil, there is no intention to reach consensus or, in other 
words, to establish the facts, including the evidence to be brought to 
trial. The logic of this contradiction eventually results in the unsuc-
cessful attempt to achieve consensus at the basis of the process: the 
facts. The judge, gathering the contradictory ideas, will carry out his 
judgment upon free conviction. 
(7) The option for bargaining in U.S. law makes the declaration 
of guilt indispensable.118 Moreover, the idea of confession, regret, and 
forgiveness appear to always be linked to local religious rituals.119 It 
would be difficult, indeed, to say that in a given society, the religious 
values should be separated from the way in which this same society 
addresses the regulation of the local law. In the case of the U.S., a na-
tion with a very striking Protestant tradition,120 it is not difficult to 
perceive the intermingling of these issues. 
 
 117. Consensus-Based Decision-Making Processes, CONSENSUS COUNCIL, INC. 3, 
http://www.nd.gov/ndsd/docs/consensus-process.pdf.  
 118. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-
guilty/.  
119. Paul Lauritzen, Forgiveness: Moral Prerogative or Religious Duty?, 15(2) J. RELIGION 
ETHICS 141, 141 (1987). In general, according to my observation, many people agree 
that many of these concepts mirror many of our religious values, but very many law-
yers and judges would vehemently deny that U.S. legal system is linked to “religious 
rituals” and would argue quite vociferously that they have separation of church and 
state, unlike Brazil where it is possible to keep a large crucifix in the corner of the 
courtroom. 
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(8) Contrary to what occurs in the U.S. culture, in Brazil, the 
maintenance of law is more the result of the concealment of the con-
flict.121 In American law, the negotiation, as observed by the institu-
tion of plea bargaining, is transparent (regarding the forms of guilt 
and truth) and this is the characteristic that legitimizes the process.122 
Hence, the need to make the comparison by confrontation and not by 
similarity arises because mixing a system of consensus with a system 
of dissent, whether it is accusatory (where charges are public) or in-
quisitorial (where charges are written and secretive) is the heart of the 
problem. 
(9) In Brazil, the state has the justice in its hands.123 The King is 
the Emperor.124 These differences in the origin of the process demon-
strate how these systems are anchored in different places. For this 
reason, it is evident that the identification of plea bargaining is linked 
to this feature of discretion, which does not occur in Brazil. 
(10) Victory, game, opponent, and defeat are expressions that 
denote not only a relationship—as could appear at first—with the so-
lution of the disputes found in the trials, but also in the negotiation of 
plea bargaining. The bargain is also performed in an arena behind the 
scenes, which is typical of an adversarial system. However, all of the-
se rules, unlike in Brazil, are transparent and are part of the system. 
(11) In U.S. law, the bargain is not limited to the intention of re-
ducing the penalty to be imposed. From the moment the accused de-
 
120. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations 
on the Western Legal Tradition, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 479-80 (June 2008). In my field-
work, I could also talk to Judge “M” who said, “I don’t think this simply reflects a 
Protestant tradition. As a practicing Catholic, I am constantly reminded of sin, confes-
sion, regret, and forgiveness, but I agree that I sometimes feel like I must hear a state-
ment of regret and admission of sin before I can ‘forgive.’ I think one difference is that 
we Catholics confess in private. Some Protestants seem to be compelled to make pub-
lic confessions, or at least statements of regret.” 
 121. Matthew S. Winters & Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, Lacking Information or Condoning 
Corruption? Voter Attitudes Toward Corruption in Brazil, COMP. POL. 418, 419-20 
(2013).  
122. Scott D. Hammond, The U.S. Model of Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal 
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clares himself guilty, the negotiating parties establish their highest 
degree of discretion. When the prosecutor, the lawyer, and the judge 
start the negotiation, assuming there is a possibility of a declaration 
of guilt, a large opening regarding the “destination” of the accused 
and the legal classification of the committed crime can be “chosen.” 
Therefore, the prosecution will be formulated by a symbolic fact, 
which is “created” by means of a negotiation. On the negotiating ta-
ble, the penal code does not serve as a parameter for the suitability of 
the practiced conduct, but as a range of options that serves as the 
helm for the choice (pick up) of the punishment to be applied. 
(12) The term “plead guilty,” for citizens in general, is not purely 
a technical legal term. It is expressly and commonly pronounced by 
them. Unlike in Brazil, where information of certain procedures of 
the criminal proceedings is reserved for the experts, all of the classes 
in the U.S. are familiar with and fully aware of pleading guilty. 
(13) In terms of development, the identification of the differ-
ences in the concept of citizenship in Brazil and in the United States 
is vital to understand the current Brazilian juridical landscape and, 
particularly, the criminal institutes involved. Socio-economic differ-
ences are typical of a capitalist model, but they do not prevent (on the 
contrary) legal equality, which is a real current attribute for the justi-
fication of privileges. 
(14) Unlike plea bargaining, in which there is a consensus be-
tween the parties, in Brazil, this consensus is introduced by the D.A., 
who in practice is situated in the upper hierarchy. Agreements are not 
consensual because the parties, specially the defendant, do not know 
the real purpose of each of the hearings. The conciliators, the real 
holders of “power,” want to get rid of the process. Moreover, to 
achieve this, they take advantage of a concept that is already known 
in Brazilian legal culture: the process is a problem that one should 
eliminate. Thus, contrary to what occurs in the adversarial system, 
where the consensus is a remarkable factor, we found that in the Bra-
zilian case, the negotiation enjoys a masked inquisitorial characteris-
tic. Moreover, this transparency gives legitimacy to the process. 
(15) The attempt to import models derived from different legal 
systems creates what is called “cognitive dissonance.”125 Both the 
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comparison of the similarities between criminal negotiation and plea 
bargaining and the importation of the latter to Brazilian law (as in-
tended by the proposal to reform the CP) collide in the problem of the 
paradox. In the U.S., the due process of law aims at individual guar-
antees, whereas in Brazil, the due process of law has been safeguard-
ing the interests of the process itself, which makes it more of a state 
guarantee than a right of individual freedom. 
 
 
 
